German exports to Kyrgyzstan until May 2024 are as high as ever. These things, of course, end up in Russia, where they help Putin.
Nearly two-and-a-half years after Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine, Moscow's war machine remains dependent on energy revenue — despite unprecedented Western sanctions that have hit it but not removed it.
Russian oil, natural gas and coal exports continue to grow rapidly in the largest Asian markets, especially China and India. Even Europe, which largely cut off Russian gas after the invasion, is secretly buying far more crude from tankers to meet its energy needs, indirectly helping to finance the invader.
Russia's income from energy exports before the war was about 1 billion euros a day, but a series of sanctions in the last 18 months to June this year reduced it to about 660 million euros. Just last month, Russia recorded a rare current account surplus, a sign of strong exports. The fight using sanctions, like the war itself, has stalled.
Some aspects of Russia's energy exports have disappeared, such as pipeline exports of natural gas, which have all but disappeared from the lucrative European market. But the country's exports of oil and refined products, which account for the largest share of sales, remained largely unchanged after the first shock in the first months after the imposition of Western sanctions, and state revenues even increased slightly thanks to higher global oil prices.
The history of economic sanctions against Russia has shown what all the West knew or should have known from the beginning – it is a questionable weapon. The threat of sanctions has done little to deter Moscow's ambitions to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since the war, the subsequent implementation of sanctions has been so erratic that the impact on Russia's military effort has been minimal at best, and much-needed technology for Russian arms manufacturers continues to flow through third countries.
According to the Financial Times, in the first year of the entire war, the European Union paid more money to Russia for oil and gas than it spent supporting Ukraine's war effort in the first two years. Fearing the consequences for its energy security, Germany fought hard to avoid sanctions on Russian gas.
It was a predictable turn of events, and Moscow certainly expected it, downplaying the impact of ominous Western rhetoric from the outset. Moreover, Russia had already experienced relaxed sanctions for eight years in response to the 2014 invasion of Crimea, so the Kremlin had no reason to believe that this time would be different.
In the face of Western sanctions and geopolitical changes, Russia seeks to strengthen its strategic alliance with China. The dynamics of these relationships reflect the complex web of interests and alliances that are changing the global geopolitical landscape.
